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3Abstract
This paper considers aspects of the relationship bet-
ween policies promoting private sector investment 
and growth, and policies consolidating peace. It covers 
post-conflict transitions where external authorities 
play a major role. A core contemporary peacebuilding 
policy assumption is that stimulating economic re-
covery is vital to sustaining political settlements and 
social cohesion. Yet how do we respond when policies 
to stimulate investment and imperatives to consoli-
date peace lead to contradictory choices? The paper 
considers framing investment-promotion activities as 
quasi-regulatory in nature, given that external actors 
are shaping and influencing private sector impacts on 
peacebuilding. It reflects on ideas of ‘transitionalism’ 
as a distinctive policy mindset during exceptional reco-
very periods. It addresses three questions:  
(1) what is distinctive about transitional approaches to 
influencing the ways that business actors may impact 
peacebuilding (compared with ‘routine’ developmen-
tal settings)? (2) What is distinctive about promoting 
conflict-sensitive business activity and investment, 
and how might this require different priorities? (3) What 
is the proper balance in transitional policymaking bet-
ween attracting investment to capital-starved settings, 
and requiring investment to be responsible?
1
Introduction
Promoting private sector investment and growth has steadily become a more 
important component of donor and institutional policy on fragile and conflict-
affected states and situations. That is, facilitating private sector business (re)
entry, (re)emergence, expansion and success is seen as an important compo-
nent of supporting overall economic recovery, which is itself seen as vital to 
reducing fragility and vulnerability to conflict, and/or consolidating a sustain-
able peace. What do we know about reconciling the objective of stimulating 
investment and growth, with the need to consolidate political settlements? 
What concepts and principles might guide us in cases where these two goals 
appear to lead to different policy choices?
 This working paper is intended to foster debate in this field. By defini-
tion it is only provisional in nature, advancing some ‘working assumptions’, 
claims and proposals. ‘Transitions’ come in all shapes and sizes: this paper 
tries to limit these propositions to post-conflict settings following serious and 
sustained armed conflict that are marked temporarily, and in varying degrees, 
by strong external involvement and oversight. The focus on post-conflict 
settings is adopted conscious that this paradigm (which itself refers to a very 
diverse class of situations) is not necessarily relevant to insights on situations 
of chronic insecurity and violence or complex political crises. The paper starts 
by briefly noting the policy consensus on investment-promotion and peace 
paraphrased above. It then reflects on the basic assumption that underpins 
that policy approach. It does so because it is not always obvious that ‘actions 
promoting investment and growth’ necessarily support ‘actions promoting 
peace’. Armed with this reminder, the paper asks the reader to consider 
adopting, if only for present purposes, an approach that characterises the 
activities of external peacebuilding agencies as essentially ‘regulatory’ in 
nature. It then reflects on generic attributes of what it calls ‘transitionalism’ 
– an exceptional, distinct policy approach by external actors working towards 
a host society’s self-sustained stability.
 For much-covered reasons of both legitimacy and effectiveness, such 
external actors should of course have limited ambitions in terms of their 
ability or mandate for navigating, shaping and transforming complicated 
conflict-related dynamics in the political economy of host societies. Moreover, 
any discussion of ideal approaches for outside intervenors in conflict-affected 
environments can easily be taken to suggest that these approaches involve 
mainly technical and managerial activities whose impact turns on the agency 
of external organisations, as if refining these techniques would invariably 
resolve conflict risk problems. If so, such discussion almost inevitably risks 
seriously underestimating highly political and contested nature of governance 
activities. These important basic premises and awareness of these risks 
should be understood as underlying everything that follows. Nevertheless, 
implicit in the paper is the suggestion that authorised external governmental 
actors both can and should attempt to help fragile states to manage and 
transform patterns of conflict and conflict risk (here, in terms of private 
investment and its facilitation / promotion). 
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 The paper itself also has limited ambition. It is certainly not offered as  
a full literature review and does not attempt comprehensive referencing for its 
own sake. Nor is this paper a set of prescriptions on practices and policies for 
promoting investment and growth during post-conflict peacebuilding pro-
cesses. Instead it tries to address three questions. First, what is it that is 
distinctive about transitional approaches to influencing the ways that busi-
ness actors may impact peacebuilding, compared with approaches during 
more ‘routine’ development? Second, what is distinctive about promoting 
conflict-sensitive business activity and investment (as opposed to other 
attributes one might in theory prioritise in investment, such as its quantity, 
rapidity or locally-owned nature)? How might privileging conflict risk require 
different choices? Third, what is the proper balance in transitional periods 
between setting certain standards on conflict risk (as well as social, environ-
mental and governance impact), without creating further barriers to invest-
ment in places that typically struggle to attract investment anyway?  The 
paper concludes by inviting peer discussion on developing a coherent, sound 
but useful academic and policy research agenda.
Introduction
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Reasons for Caution on the 
‘Prosperity and Peace’ Nexus
At least in their policy rhetoric, donors and international institutions working 
in and on fragile and conflict-affected states have, in recent years, placed 
increasing emphasis on supporting and stimulating private sector investment 
and growth. An interested foreign and diaspora private sector and a revital-
ised local business sector (and links between these) are perceived as signifi-
cant elements of post-conflict recovery. This emphasis persists amid what 
many practitioners know is a very difficult process of giving programmatic 
content to the prevailing development policy directive, in many Western 
capitals, to ‘do more with / on business, including in fragile states’.
 This is not the place to analyse what, in a donor-austerity, post-MDGs 
era, might be driving this policy approach and its greater emphasis on the 
private sector’s potential role in meeting the development agenda (see Ford 
2014). The approach exists alongside greater donor and institutional pragma-
tism on engaging business actors as one manifestation of ‘inclusivity’ in 
peacebuilding (Ford 2015b). The approach is exemplified by the emphasis  
put on ‘extractives-led development’ whereby donors of countries such as 
Afghanistan, Somalia and Myanmar have seen the development of oil, gas  
and mining extraction sectors as a way for fragile states to begin to self-
finance their way ‘out’ of instability (Bailey et al, 2015). This is through a model 
whereby resources revenues fund inclusive state infrastructure and service-
provision and generate employment and other economic effects. Further 
conceptual and context-based discussion is needed of the ‘extractives-led 
development’ idea, including the extent to which analogies would be valid for 
investment promotion or facilitation in relation to many other non-extractive 
sectors.
 The paper does not attempt to unpack this position further. There is 
much more work needed on the assumptions, merits, drawbacks and empirics 
of the ‘peace through prosperity’ paradigm. For one thing, we do not know 
enough about how to measure, and attribute to particular investors or invest-
ments, the supposed ‘peace-positive’ effects of commercial activity in fragile 
and conflict-affected settings (generally and case-by-case) (Bailey et al, 2015: 
41-43). This paper does not review experiences and prescriptions in promoting 
post-conflict economic recovery generally (for a recent overview, see Macin-
tosh and Buckley, 2015); incorporating peacebuilding into economic develop-
ment, or vice-versa (see recently International Alert 2015); or engaging busi-
ness in the new post-2015 development agenda (recently Nelson et al, 2015), 
including how business can contribute to advancing the SDGs by supporting 
peace (Ernstorfer et al, 2015). While the aim is to explore how peacebuilding 
authorities can influence conflict-sensitivity in business and investor conduct 
post-conflict, the paper does not review what we know about conflict-sensi-
tive business practices and their promotion (see recently in this series Graff 
and Iff, 2014).
 Instead it is enough, in setting up the issue for working discussion, to 
note here that during post-conflict periods, one role assumed by external 
governance and donor authorities is promoting / controlling private sector 
7business and investment activity. The assumption is that doing so will invari-
ably promote peace. Yet it would seem fairly obvious that new or renewed 
business and investment activity is not a peace panacea because it might 
itself be or become a source of conflict risk. Sometimes this will be the case 
despite every best conflict-sensitive practice and precaution taken by a 
business operation (and by those with regulatory or commercial influence over 
it). It follows that there may be cases where privileging ‘economic recovery’ 
leads to different choices to those involved in ‘building peace’. Critical schol-
ars have long cautioned against assumptions that ‘development brings peace’ 
so that all that is required is more and faster development after conflict (see 
e.g. Uvin 2002). The same is surely true in relation to facilitating investment 
and business activity after conflict. To deal with this point about the conflict 
risk that may exist because of not despite renewed economic activity, it will 
not always be enough to simply add the reassuring term ‘inclusive’ (growth, 
investment or development).
 For the present purposes of framing the exploratory discussion of 
‘transitionalism’ in fostering post-conflict investment and influencing its 
responsible social impact, it suffices to have made clear the observation that 
there is probably no necessary connection between (a) facilitating greater 
commercial interest and activity, and (b) building sustainable peace. This 
basic insight or proposition is central to the discussion, below, of why external 
actors need to be more responsive to the particular dynamics of individual 
settings if they are to seek to ensure that actions to promote prosperity also 
promote peace. Before doing so, it is necessary to reflect on the essential 
nature of the role assumed by external authorities when they work to promote 
responsible investment and business in post-conflict settings.
Reasons for Caution on the ‘Prosperity and Peace’ Nexus
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Framing External Peacebuilding 
as ‘Transitional Regulation’
When peace operations and other external actors or authorities attempt to 
influence and shape the trajectory of peace consolidation in a post-conflict 
setting, they can be understood as exercising a form of regulatory power 
(Ford, 2015). Now, even when very explicitly mandated to help govern post-
conflict territory and situations, most organisations today would flinch at the 
suggestion that they are ‘regulators’ of peacebuilding or that they thereby 
assume ‘regulatory’ functions, responsibilities and impacts. This is partly 
because the term ‘regulation’ is associated with sophisticated schemes with 
corresponding specialist institutions. It is also partly because the regulatory 
function is so governmental in connotation that it is seen as something 
inappropriate for external actors to undertake in other societies.
 Yet if we define ‘regulation’ as intentional acts by a public authority  
to shape subjects’ behaviour by reference to certain standards, there can be 
little doubt that external peacebuilding authorities and agencies are engaged 
in fact in a form of regulatory activity (Ford, 2015: 250-254). This is at very 
least one way to understand their role. For instance, if regulators are public 
authorities intentionally influencing subjects’ activities, then UN peace 
operations routinely act -- in effect but certainly not in name -- as temporary 
‘regulators’ of electoral processes, security sector reform, justice systems, 
etc. In varying degrees of intensity and intention, external authorities act at 
least as co-regulators of the local political economy of post-conflict transi-
tional states. This sort of activity is clearly not limited to those rare situations 
(East Timor, Kosovo) of plenary international territorial administration. Obvi-
ously there is considerable diversity in terms of how much formal and de facto 
regulatory influence different external bodies have in different post-conflict 
settings. Policies and activities that address private sector engagement in 
fragile states may influence and shape how private sector actors might affect 
post-conflict peacebuilding, and are thus regulatory in effect. Such policies 
represent a purposive exercise of public power by external governmental 
actors, and are thus also basically regulatory in nature.
 The idea of calling these sorts of activities ‘transitional regulation’ is 
intended not to ascribe new onerous roles but to ensure analytical clarity and 
reduce institutional denial about the nature of the external intervenors’ role in 
post-conflict recovery. Accepting that external actors seek systematically to 
influence outcomes in what amounts to a regulatory enterprise allows us to 
properly analyse these activities by reference to a theorised account of what 
external actors are doing (or see themselves as doing). Use of the term ‘regu-
lation’ is also important as a reminder that those wielding such influence are 
often in denial about the extent and nature of their power to shape process 
and outcomes in other societies (e.g., Chandler, 2006). Of course, ‘normal’ 
developing countries not undergoing any special transition period are routinely 
directly and indirectly subject to the regulatory impulses and influences of 
international and external actors. Their governments’ regulatory terrain on  
any number of topics is invariably heavily criss-crossed with the regulatory 
footprints of many external financial, creditor, donor, and other institutions. 
Once we acknowledge this truth, there is no great leap in accepting that those 
9agencies involved - often so intimately - in supporting post-conflict recovery 
are clearly exercising a form of regulatory function, typically alongside con-
flict-affected host institutions. Perhaps a term such as ‘governance’ or 
‘assistance’ feels less intrusive and more acceptable to those sensitive to 
legitimacy concerns. Yet it is difficult to deny that in many respects what is 
involved is regulatory in nature and effect.
 During post-conflict recovery periods of the sort considered here, the 
core assumption is that the high degree of external governance and engage-
ment is transitory and is intended to enable the society to resume a ‘normal’ 
developmental path that is less obviously or directly saturated with external 
governmental and other influence. Of course, whether it is appropriate, 
legitimate or indeed effective for outsiders to assume these exceptional 
influential shaping (regulatory) roles in post-conflict societies is a different 
question. Such considerations, on the justification for intrusive governance 
and the overall notion of external peacebuilders as ‘transitional regulators’, 
have been extensively developed elsewhere (Ford, 2015: Ch. 6). Instead the 
remainder of this paper is given over to exploring the implications, for policy 
posture and programme design, of the temporary nature of outsiders’ regula-
tory functions in post-conflict societies, in this case in relation to promoting 
responsible business activity and investment. The question becomes how  
to ensure an appropriate transitionalism in regulatory interventions in host 
societies. This is what the paper focuses on. There is of course a closely 
related why question, because the way in which external bodies might pro-
mote responsible, conflict-sensitive post-conflict business practices takes its 
shape from the rationale both for undertaking such governance and oversight 
roles, and for reducing that role by largely exiting the scene in favour of 
capacitated and legitimate local regulatory institutions. That is, transitional-
ism is ‘appropriate’ because it is self-consciously temporary and geared to 
gradually reducing external influence and empowering legitimate local 
governance.
 One very important parallel issue can be put aside at this point. This is 
done even though it is somewhat artificial to distinguish regulatory intentions 
and impacts of external actors in relation to post-conflict transitional settings 
(specifically directed to governance in that setting), and what these govern-
ments do in / from their own regulatory space (but with transnational effects, 
including on post-conflict states). There may often be an overlap in the iden-
tity of states influencing international peacebuilding efforts and the home 
states of firms investing in fragile host states. That issue relates to the earlier 
observation about how global and transnational governance and regulatory 
schemes, both public and private in nature, are visible on any mapping of most 
less-developed countries’ regulatory domains. There seems to be an open 
research agenda on the nexus of regulating responsible business conduct 
abroad, and promoting investment during peacebuilding and/or in fragile 
states. This paper addresses the intersection of externally-supported ‘in-
country’ peacebuilding activities with policies to revitalise business and 
investment. That is, it relates mostly to what outside bilateral and multilateral 
Framing External Peacebuilding as ‘Transitional Regulation’
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 1 Also put to one side here are more pro-
found debates about the intersection 
of regulation, external governance and 
investment flows in relation to ‘structu-
ral’ elements of crises, or states to some 
extent trapped in structural ‘chronic crisis’. 
The paper does not address the macro-
level patterns that constrain the ability of 
some polities and economies to graduate 
from chronic under-development, under-
investment and insecurity. Such issues are 
significant to assumptions about ‘resumed 
normality’ post-crisis.
2 Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights, A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 2011, 
endorsed by UN HRC Resolution 17/4 of 16 
June 2011, [7] (conflict-affected areas).  
A somewhat related issue is the incorpora-
tion of provisions relating to social impact 
in investment and trade instruments, 
and investment contracts, to the extent 
that these are negotiated or renegotiated 
during the transition (Ford, 2015c; Ford, 
2015: 159-162).
agencies and authorities do within host post-conflict states’ territorial and 
regulatory domains.1 Yet much of the positive, peace-enhancing influence that 
external states and organisations might have on the business-peace nexus 
may come from what they do in their own regulatory spheres. The higher-
capacity regulatory ‘home’ states in these scenarios - that are exporting both 
investment capital and post-conflict governance assistance - may have a 
duty, responsibility or opportunity to exercise public power to influence the 
impact on conflict risk and human rights, in post-conflict settings, of transna-
tional investors and businesses who fall within their jurisdiction.2  
 This ‘home state advantage’ (Simons and Macklin, 2014) in regulatory 
influence may be very important in relation to how foreign firms conduct 
themselves in weakly regulated post-conflict settings. However, an approach 
steeped in the ethics and practicalities of transitionalism would insist that 
scholars proposing home-state regulation as the solution to the governance 
gap on conflict-sensitive / rights-compliant business activity in fragile states 
should also factor in an element of building the capacity of host states to 
regulate these issues themselves. The idea of networked transnational 
co-regulation (by home / investor-sending states and in-country transitional 
peacebuilding authorities) of responsible business conduct in post-conflict 
settings, with an explicit element of building host capacity to influence 
business responsibility, is considered elsewhere (Ford 2015).
Framing External Peacebuilding as ‘Transitional Regulation’
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‘Transitionalism’: General Propositions
This paper is concerned with influencing conflict-sensitive business practices 
in post-conflict situations where external authorities have assumed various 
peacebuilding and statebuilding roles.3 Of particular interest to the discussion 
below about ‘transitionalism’ is a proposition that has attracted considerable 
policy consensus in this millennium. This is that there is, or ought to be, 
something distinctive about policy approaches in post-conflict settings (del 
Castillo, 2003: 12-16; Junne and Verkoren, 2004; Collier, 2008: 103).4 
 The idea of distinctive policies during an early post-conflict ‘window of 
opportunity’ (for external actors to attempt to foster conditions for sustain-
able peace) pervades current policy approaches and the peacebuilding 
literature. This window, and its related notion of policy distinctiveness, 
explains for example the existence of specialized units within international 
institutions and governments (for example, USAID’s ‘Office of Transitional 
Initiatives’). Often, the ‘window’ idea is made explicit. For instance, UN Peace-
keeping Guidelines note that ‘opportunities lost during this period are hard to 
regain’ (DPKO, 2008: 62).5 Mostly, the idea of temporary, transiting roles where 
responsibility is progressively handed over and capacity built locally is implicit 
in all these sorts of endeavours, even where they drag on for a decade or more. 
Moreover, scholars have premised their prescriptive contributions on ideas of 
the ‘opportunity’ or ‘critical threshold’ for outside authorities to catalyse 
transformation of conflict risk patterns during this period (e.g. Junne and 
Verkoren, 2004: 307; Goodhand, 2006, 297; Call, 2008: 9). 
 Collier has likewise argued that the ‘break in the political equilibrium’ 
represented by a post-conflict political settlement makes attempts to intro-
duce innovative policies and catalyse significant reform somewhat easier than 
similar attempts to engineer change in stable, not post-conflict developing 
countries (Collier, 2008: 103-9; 2007: 18). Collier argues that the chances of a 
‘quantum improvement’ in governance and policymaking in the first decade 
after a major conflict are much higher than for stable developing countries, 
partly due to higher levels of pro-reform ‘social capital’ and partly due to 
external actors’ presence balancing out local vested interests who in ‘normal’ 
development scenarios might block reform efforts (2008: 108-9).
 We must attempt to unpack the idea of ‘transitionalism’ a little if one is 
to maintain the conventional suggestion that there is something distinctive, 
for policy formation and execution purposes, about transitional post-conflict 
periods or phases. In this context, ‘transitionalism’ as used here refers to 
exceptional measures and mindsets, in the aftermath of serious violent 
political upheaval, adopted and implemented before the resumption of 
‘normal’ governance and development under the rule of law, but which are 
intended to enable a society to ‘arrive’ at that more routine developmental 
path. During these periods the assumption is that external assistance / 
intervention is at its most significant in helping to create conditions for 
appropriate local authorities to assume or resume substantial and effective 
control (UNDG 2004). Of course transitions can vary in degrees of formality 
and explicitness: the temporary plenary international administration of 
 3 Many peacebuilding activities can also 
be described as early ‘statebuilding’ roles 
(see Call, 2008: 12; Whaites, 2008: 4), but 
definitional debates here are beyond this 
working paper’s scope.
4 Definitional issues about the term ‘post-
conflict’ are beyond this paper’s scope, 
while recognizing that there is no one 
kind of ‘post-conflict’ setting, and that 
outsiders’ roles vary in intensity, duration, 
formality, etc.
5 See also for example UN Doc. A/63/881-
S/2009/304, 11 June 2009, [3].
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 6 Ford 2015 explores in detail how, even if 
the idea of ‘regulating business for peace’ 
were seen as desirable and do-able, at 
present no single institution across the 
UN and World Bank Group / Bretton Woods 
systems sees itself as bearing operational 
responsibility (cf. the UN Global Compact) 
for informing and influencing conflict-sen-
sitive business practices during peace-
building.
7 It is unnecessary to traverse the huge 
transitional justice literature. Work on the 
political economy of transitions to market 
economies and /or democracy (e.g., Ro-
land, 2002) contains few insights for the 
role of in-country external actors conside-
red here.
territory (such as in East Timor between 1999 and 2002) is very rare relative to 
typical transitions marked by less definitive legal dispensations.
 More generally, in describing a set of special approaches for transitional 
periods we must acknowledge the artificiality, often, in distinguishing post-
conflict transitions from development-as-usual. For one thing, external 
governance intrusiveness in net terms may be just as pervasive relation to 
Malawi (an aid-dependent largely stable state not physically hosting any 
external authorities) as in Mali (a post-conflict, post-coup ‘fragile’ state with 
an obvious external presence). Since neither conflict nor peace are static 
concepts or situations, it is difficult to define when a transition is underway, 
let alone when it is complete (Kleffner 2008). Not only are all societies in some 
constant state of flux, but many perceived transitions continue for a decade 
or more. Moreover, terms such as ‘post-conflict’ and ‘transition’ have political 
relevance, and it will for example often be expedient for host or intervening 
authorities to define situations as transitional for various political and policy 
reasons. Finally these settings are of course not regulatory ‘clean slates’ or 
vacuums awaiting external regulatory initiatives. This point is relevant since a 
teleological approach to ‘transitionalism’ can (wrongly) seem to suggest that 
post-conflict societies will not have plural sources of and institutions for 
formal and informal governance influence, some of which will co-opt, resist  
or distort well-intentioned external efforts. In relation to ‘the private sector’, 
there are no neat distinctions between the main political and the main eco-
nomic actors in many societies of the sort under consideration.
 All these sorts of considerations do undermine the coherence of a 
distinctive notion of transitionalism, understood as a set of ‘interventions’ 
(assistance techniques and approaches and philosophies). Nevertheless, the 
concept is arguably coherent enough to ground some insights into the tempo-
rary governance or regulatory roles assumed by external agencies post-con-
flict. The position developed below does not, on one view, represent a dra-
matic leap from conventional peacebuilding understanding and practice.6 That 
is, transitional approaches to moderating any conflict risk relating to invest-
ment activities are not necessarily different in nature, difficulty or signifi-
cance to the transitionalism that marks external involvement in post-conflict 
justice, constitution-making, electoral support or security sector reform. 
Inherent in ideas of ‘transitional justice’ is the notion that exceptional meas-
ures that would not be justified in a ‘normal’ rule-of-law dispensation (such as 
amnesties from criminal prosecution) are not only justifiable but sometimes 
necessary if a divided, conflict-affected society is to resume or move towards 
that idealised more ‘routine’ dispensation. Despite pleas in the literature to 
move beyond its dichotomy, the difficult ‘peace vs. justice’ balance essentially 
informs the need for such exceptional and sequential approaches.7 Likewise 
the argument in the following section is that in relation to post-conflict 
business and investment activities (and their promotion), a similar transitional 
approach may be warranted in order to balance (a) the need to stimulate 
economic development activity, with (b) the imperative for new investment 
and reinvestment, from whatever source, to be socially and environmentally 
Transitionalism’: General Propositions
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responsible, conflict-sensitive, while (c) not impairing efforts to instil respon-
sive, inclusive and legitimate local public governance.
 The idea of graduated and sequential policy activities and postures in 
crisis and ‘post’-crisis situations is, of course, not a new one. At the intersec-
tion of the humanitarian response and development assistance spheres, the 
notion of a continuum from ‘relief to development’ has a long pedigree now 
(Ross et al, 1994; Smillie 1998). That notion was about a need for coordinated 
and synergistic approaches that, over time and in response to changing 
scenarios, aim to shift short-term emergency responses (justifiable and 
necessary, but not sustainable for various reasons) to more long-term sus-
tainable development programming. Indeed, in its ideal form the seeds of 
longer-term practices and processes are planted during the exceptional / 
emergency phase. A ‘rehabilitation’ phase bridges the ‘relief’ and ‘develop-
ment’ phases, in this idealization. Given that the reality of post-conflict 
recovery in particular belied the smooth, neat linear sequencing connoted by 
the ‘continuum’ idea, policymakers began from the 2000s to move beyond it 
(Macrae and Hammer, 2004). For this reason now, some approach the notion  
in terms of the relief-rehabilitation-development ‘contiguum’ (e.g., EU, 2012). 
This is suggestive of greater pragmatism in using simultaneous approaches, 
trading-off competing considerations, and responsiveness to the effective-
ness of interventions irrespective of the presumed ‘phase’ at the time. Never-
theless, inherent in the basic idea of a responsive continuum of approaches is 
something with some enduring conceptual appeal in terms of conflict trans-
formation. This is so for practical reasons too, since external actors do need 
some working plan and orienting schema to guide their complex activities in 
host societies and ensure appropriate local ‘ownership’. This is so even if they 
are not (and should not be) rigidly wedded to that schema because they are (or 
should be) acutely conscious that they can by no means smoothly control and 
sequence a process of shifting a society from patterns of conflict to a more 
peaceable sustainable development path.
 External peacebuilding authorities might conceivably adopt various 
policy objectives (from ensuring justice to inclusive growth) as the overall 
purposive guide to decision-making and planning. ‘Transitionalism’ as it is 
developed here posits that the consequences of renewed social and political 
violence are normally so severe that the singular priority in an early post-con-
flict period is ensuring stability and maintaining the political settlement. If so, 
all post-conflict policymaking needs to be assessed from the perspective of 
whether or not it will reduce the risk of conflict (del Castillo, 2003: 12-16; 
Collier, 2008: 104). Thus everything in the immediate post-conflict phase is 
viewed through a ‘conflict lens’, so that not every objectively valuable social 
goal is treated equally. The priority is preventing renewed conflict and so 
transitionalism (as conceived here) is relatively pragmatic about how to do 
that. Transitional regulation is responsive, involves risk-taking, allows for 
unusual decision-maker discretion, and privileges flexibility over consistency, 
at least in the immediate post-settlement period.
Transitionalism’: General Propositions
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 However, along with being characterised by pragmatism and a conflict 
lens, the approach is also infused with notions of gradualism. Here the sup-
posedly discredited ‘continuum’ idea still has clear utility. This is because as 
circumstances change and as the postures of various players and peace 
stakeholders change, those leading peacebuilding coordination efforts might 
shift or adapt their approach, consistent with notions of transitioning. For one 
thing, there is an inherent tension between ‘maintaining stability’ (generally 
heavily status quo) and ‘fostering transformation’ (possibly disruptive or 
threatening to some interests). Gradualism is needed so that the conflict lens 
does not overly privilege stability if stability conditions suggest that things 
can be moved on a bit. Without being rigid or linear, the approach may be 
understood as a continuum of sequential overall objectives, where raw peace-
maintenance preferences gradually give way to more orthodox rule of law and 
developmental strategies. Thus transitional regulation requires progressively 
giving weight to other goals as conflict risk recedes and local capacity grows. 
It also involves helping to build and avoid crowding-out that capacity. This 
manifest basic democratic principles, because as time goes on it will normally 
become more important that local authorities regulate poorly than that 
transitory external agencies regulate very well.
 The next section explores these ideas in relation to transitional busi-
ness regulation, but they are arguably generic concepts whatever the subject-
matter or actors sought to be influenced. Moreover, this responsive approach 
to achieving regulatory goals accords with existing policy consensus on aid 
effectiveness in fragile situations, which emphasises innovation, flexibility, 
risk-taking, and preparedness to put aside rigid frameworks.8 Under the OECD 
approach (OECD, 2007) on ‘good’ international engagement in fragile situa-
tions, Principle 9 is ‘act fast’ and Principle 4 is ‘prioritise prevention’, while 
OECD-DAC Guideline 8 (OECD, 2001) is ‘act in timely and flexible ways.’ Since a 
decade ago, flexibility, realism, selectivity and ‘systematic adaptability’ were 
core themes of the World Bank-recommended approach to fragile situations 
(World Bank, 2005; also UNDG and World Bank, 2005: 3).9 For instance, a high 
degree of ‘fluidity’ and changing project strategy is seen as a responsive virtue 
rather than a departure from policy (World Bank, 2005).
 These general comments are intended to contextualise the more 
specific discussion in the next section, where the attributes of transitionalism 
(and transitional regulation, here of responsible business) are given more 
content. The ideas are fairly familiar to scholars and practitioners, in terms  
of the special trade-offs sometimes required in exceptional circumstances, 
provided there is a gradual shift over time in the emphasis. An example is the 
trade-off between flexibility and integrity in governance procedures, where 
more weight may be given to discretion and responsiveness in decision-mak-
ers in an immediate post-conflict emergency, than is given to the procedural 
safeguards required for sustained good governance in future.
 Before moving on, caution is of course required because some use of 
the term ‘transitional’ might ironically promote unresponsive and formulaic 
Transitionalism’: General Propositions
 8 Roundtable 7 to the 3rd High Level Forum 
on Aid Effectiveness (Accra, 2-4 Sep-
tember 2008), especially 5, 8-9, 12; Accra 
Agenda for Action, 3rd High Level Forum 
(Accra, 4 September 2008), [21](d).
9 See the emphasis on ‘flexibility and 
adaptability’ in peacebuilding: A/63/881-
S/2009/304, 11 June 2009, [22].
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policy. Like ‘continuum’, the term can be misleading, suggesting that transi-
tional governance efforts or situations are smooth, logical and linear auto-
matic progressions towards stable development, and are uncontested, with 
local actors passively carried along. The fallacy of this explains why scholars 
such as Carothers (2002) and Bhuta (2009), for example, have memorably and 
rightly criticized the ‘transition paradigm’ and ‘transitology’. Ideas of regulat-
ing or steering other stakeholders’ conduct imply a high degree of control over 
events which will not necessarily be realistic. Such levels of control may not 
be advisable or legitimate even if they exist. This paper’s ideas of a role and 
methodology for external actors in regulating the peacebuilding impacts of 
business are advanced conscious of the need to avoid a managerial approach, 
since peacebuilding, statebuilding and regulation of course are not apolitical 
technical exercises where local actors have no agency (Macrae and Hammer, 
2004: 3, 9).
 Accepting these cautions, this paper now turns to flesh out ideas of 
transitional business regulation by transitory peacebuilding authorities acting 
alongside various local authorities and others. It draws on notions of respon-
sive regulation as applied to post-conflict settings (Ford 2015). This is on the 
basis that efforts to influence (‘regulate’) how investors and businesspeople 
impact on peace and security should be responsive both (a) to businesses’ 
varying capacities to self-manage conflict risk within their sphere, and (b) to 
the changing conflict risk level which may suggest more or less stringency in 
terms of insisting on conflict-sensitive business practices. Thus for example  
in their multi-year ‘Peacebuilding Compared’ project, Braithwaite and others 
have considered how transitionalism – an inherent responsiveness and 
flexibility, but steering towards a more secure phase – is vital in managing the 
dynamics of peace consolidation. This is because at different points, various 
actors’ motivational postures towards cooperating in peacebuilding might 
change, from resistance, to capitulation, game-playing to disengagement, or 
(ideally) commitment to a transformed or renewed normative order (Braith-
waite et al, 2010: 435).
 What then is distinctive about transitional approaches to influencing the 
ways that business actors may impact peacebuilding (compared with ‘routine’ 
developmental settings)? Elsewhere I have considered at length the attributes 
of one approach by temporary external authorities to influencing conflict-sen-
sitive business activity, in terms of ensuring that investment-promotion in 
such scenarios is both responsive (including to businesses’ own capacities to 
make regulatory contributions) and responsible (among other things, giving 
effect to protective standards) (Ford, 2015: 195-224). Section 2 above briefly 
discussed the policy parameters justifying such a regulatory role (see more 
generally Ford, 2015: 264-269). Section 5 below considers how, assuming they 
have some influence, external peacebuilders might position a framework that 
attracts investment and stimulates for-profit activity while also insisting on 
certain social impact and governance standards. In what follows there is no 
particular effort to distinguish between various business and industry sec-
tors, which like individual enterprises vary hugely in their conflict-relevant 
Transitionalism’: General Propositions
attributes, capacities and impacts. This approach is adopted conscious that 
ideas for influencing conflict-sensitive practices are far more satisfying when 
attuned to the realities of sectoral variation within what we tend to generalise 
as ‘the private sector’.10 This paper is not particularly directed to the informal 
sector(s), although the bulk of commercial activity will probably occur there, 
as will some donor efforts to link informal enterprises into the labour and 
supply-chains of more formal enterprises.
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may be public in the sense of state-owned, 
even if ‘for-profit’. 
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Might a Peacebuilding Lens 
Result in Different Choices on 
Fostering Investment?
What is distinctive about promoting conflict-sensitive business activity and 
investment, and how might this require different priorities? It is helpful to 
contrast two hypothetical extremes during transitions of this sort: an investor 
‘no-go’ zone and an investment free-for-all. At one end, external authorities 
attempt to isolate entirely a vulnerable post-conflict society from the poten-
tially destabilising and distorting effect of an inflow of new investment and 
business activity. At the other extreme, external actors take no action or 
position on renewed local and foreign business activity or entry, no matter 
how filled it might be with conflict risk through corruptive, exploitative, 
dangerous or damaging practices. The first ‘no-go’ idea is not a million miles 
away from UN Security Council powers related to economic embargoes. 
However, it suffers of course from practical enforceability problems and from 
an indefensible external paternalism that would not survive contact with 
principles of sovereign local control over economic destiny especially in 
relation to finite natural resources. The second extreme is indefensible seen 
through the ‘conflict lens’ as well as through the prism of the 2011 UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights (‘UNGPs’) and other frameworks.
 
 In between these extremes is a difficult balance. On the conventional 
assumption that encouraging post-conflict business activity and related 
job-creation, tax-paying, etc., also helps consolidate peace, some workable 
medium seems necessary to resolve issues where the ‘growth’ imperative 
conflicts with the ‘conflict prevention’ one, in relation to business actors and 
activity. Transitional business regulation is advanced as one approach. In this 
sense it involves viewing investor and business conduct through a ‘conflict 
lens’ when deciding upon a suitable strategy for controlling, promoting, 
facilitating (‘regulating’) that conduct. It suggests a readiness to ‘trade off’ 
other objectives and temporarily prefer choices that consolidate peace over 
actions to illustrate or implement the rule of law or other related values or 
goals. Regulating these other priorities will mostly have positive peacebuild-
ing effects and no trade-off will be needed. But in early periods the pursuit of 
ideal legal and law enforcement frameworks is not always compatible with the 
maintenance of peace and security.
 Regulating businesses for peace will involve different decisions from 
regulating for revenue, investment and growth, the rule of law, or (in excep-
tional cases) human rights. Post-conflict business regulation finds analogies 
in transitional constitutionalism, transitional justice, and states of emergency. 
Transitional regulation succeeds partly by having a strategy for gradually 
giving competing social goals due weight. Consider an analogy. A decision to 
postpone elections after a peace agreement affects the right to vote. How-
ever, premature elections might greatly elevate conflict risk. A transitionalist 
approach would be quite prepared to postpone voting: delaying ‘democracy’  
to ensure a more sustainable democratic outcome. Likewise in transitional 
justice foregoing criminal justice is sometimes the price for securing commit-
ment to a peace deal. Likewise too a transitional economic regulator, looking 
at things through the conflict lens, would allow political stability concerns to 
trump economic efficiency ones, at least in the early post-settlement days. 
The pragmatic ‘conflict lens’ of transitional regulation involves hierarchies of 
18
objectives, whereas orthodox peacebuilding at least in the UN system some-
times displays a ‘resistance to prioritization’.11 Orthodox doctrine attempts to 
give equal attention to issues that may not hold significant conflict risk at 
least in early stages. 
 How might a transitional business regulation approach look? Routine 
rule of law perspectives would view economic activity as either ‘licit’ or ‘illicit’. 
Transitionalism by contrast would adopt a ‘peaceful’ or ‘not-peaceful’ catego-
risation in the early phases. This is because a rules-based enforcement 
strategy based on neat categories of ‘licit’ and ‘illicit’ behaviour risks not  
only overlooking potential sources of livelihood and social cohesion but also 
deepening informal shadow economies of organised crime and extortion. 
Transitional business regulation draws from ideas of inclusive post-conflict 
‘spoiler management’ in terms of economic activity (Cockayne and Pfister, 
2008). The transitional regulatory posture is accommodating to all peaceable 
business activities, formal and informal. The issue is not the legality of for-
profit activity but a group’s capacity to build or spoil peace and social cohe-
sion. Former combatants may crave new social identities and recognition 
through more mainstream business activities. A respectful inclusive approach 
recognising the potential of these actors to become licit businesspeople may 
greatly contribute to peacebuilding and crime prevention (see for example 
Reno 2008; Kreidler 2009). Viewing such groups through a law enforcement 
lens may mean missed opportunities. Later, greater emphasis can be placed 
on ensuring legal rights and parameters are respected. This is vital for longer-
term conflict mitigation, but an overly strict rule-of-law approach to for-profit 
activity early on may have negative conflict risk implications.
 Transitional regulatory mindsets (equipped with a conflict lens) mean 
preparedness in the interim period to focus on a few particular business sites 
or risks and largely ignore others. Transitional regulation might make some 
‘hard calls’ that would be indefensible in ordinary circumstances. For exam-
ple, if the ‘regulatory’ priority is asserting the rule of law, this might require 
peacebuilding authorities (such as a peace operation) to remove a group 
unlawfully but peaceably occupying and operating a sawmill business. Busi-
ness regulation through a transitional and conflict lens looks different. Early 
on, the group might be left alone. The strategic regulatory priority is peace 
consolidation, use of force has unpredictable consequences, so the rule-of-
law concern is temporarily subsumed to the peace imperative. Later, as part  
of signalling normalcy and the rule of law, the sawmill occupants will be 
encouraged or rewarded to leave. Applying the conflict lens does not mean 
that no action is taken early on to signal the rule of law. 
 Yet it must be noted that if regulation is to remain responsible and not 
lose its way, its pragmatism needs to be guided by principle. Thus if the 
conflict lens suggests allowing ex-fighters to continue illegally operating a 
sawmill, the human rights unit in a peace operation or some networked civil 
society group might conduct a rights impact analysis. Likewise if an external 
authority with influence over the transition turns a blind eye to instances of  11 A/63/881-S/2009/304, 11 June 2009, [22].
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corruption involving business actors in order to bed down a fragile peace, it 
must still look for opportunities to begin ‘raising the bar’ on anti-corruption 
standards. The business must at least be warned about and commit to receiv-
ing future anti-corruption assistance measures.
 Thus compromises aimed at mitigating conflict risk must be the excep-
tion. Trade-off decisions must also sow the seeds for enjoying subsumed 
rights without such compromises once conflict risk subsides. At some point, 
exceptional interim means begin to compromise the long-term rule of law and 
human rights objectives that are important both intrinsically and for long-term 
conflict prevention. Goal-focussed regulation is transitional in that it recog-
nises that as peace consolidates, the goals may change. As time passes the 
transitional regulator (alongside state authorities) can more confidently 
address other objectives, making less stark trade-offs and gradually privi- 
leging law and justice choices over peace ones.
 Gradualism and keeping an eye out for early opportunities to plant 
seeds for long-term transformation of regulatory or business cultures is vital 
if transitional regulation is to retain its integrity. The theory of transitional 
business regulation posits that temporary external peacebuilding authorities 
(‘regulators’ of peace) should look for and respond to peacebuilding strengths 
in business actors, not just seek to control problems related to these actors.  
It suggests mainly drawing on the self-regulatory capacities of business 
actors, given business self-interest in conflict risk reduction and given capac-
ity constraints on peacebuilders who have other mandated tasks. This strat-
egy involves deliberately inviting and requiring business to exercise conflict-
sensitivity within its sphere; the ‘self-regulation’ is conditional on business 
ability or willingness to do this. By engaging in this task of influencing (‘regu-
lating’), the private sector is encouraged to reflect on relevant conflict and 
peace risks and opportunities and to seek appropriate help if needed. Along 
with local authorities, in theory the ‘regulatory-minded’ peacebuilder (Ford, 
2015: Ch. 8) can pull strings to release actors’ potential or to constrain unde-
sirable behaviour, identifying and managing business ‘bottlenecks’ to peace. 
In so doing and in addressing the ways in which business activity might impact 
upon the process of rebuilding societies after conflict, external agencies with 
an in-country footprint can act as transitional business regulators directly and 
alongside the (re-)emerging state apparatus.
 In some transitional settings businesses may be a negligible source of 
peacebuilding risk or opportunity. But intentionally engaging businesses in 
conditional self-regulation on mostly shared conflict risk concerns gives 
peacebuilding authorities one less thing to worry about. It can also help to 
catalyse new ways of doing and regulating business in a fragile society. A 
relevant peacebuilding authority should communicate broad expectations  
and minimum standards for business behaviour apparatus. Ideally, transi-
tional business regulation should stimulate interest, excellence and habit  
in business self-regulation of conflict-sensitive and protective practices.  
It should set an early example and tone for responsive regulation by state 
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agencies (Whaites 2008). It should rely on and develop plural regulatory 
networks of oversight and support. ‘Success’ in transitional regulation might 
include whether the peace operation uses the opportunities presented during 
the ‘window of opportunity’ soon after it arrives, to promote a culture of 
socially-responsible business practices and catalyse networks devoted to 
regulating this.
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How do we Promote ‘Good 
Enough’ Standards without 
Deterring ‘Good’ Firms?
The bulk of analysis in this paper may place too strong an assumption on the 
idea that external actors involved in post-conflict peacebuilding are well-coor-
dinated, interested enough in the conflict-sensitivity of business actors, and 
capable of influencing outcomes by shaping expectations and steering behav-
iours. On that assumption, what is the appropriate balance, in transitional 
business regulation, between attracting investment to capital-starved set-
tings, and requiring that investment to be responsible? In particular, in shap-
ing an investment environment is there an inevitable balance between ensur-
ing certain social impact standards are met (in a vulnerable setting) versus 
not setting too high a standard (in a setting that business finds risky enough 
without the extra burden of onerous standards).
 This idea seems to warrant further analysis because at first glance it 
might be argued that post-conflict settings struggle so hard to attract capital 
that the policy priority is to attract local and diaspora re-investment, and 
foreign investment. Those arguing this would say that peacebuilders should be 
worrying more about the quantity of commercial activity than its quality. Such 
views would relate to the ‘peace through prosperity’ paradigm discussed in 
section 2 above. However, transitionalism’s ‘conflict lens’ would suggest that 
there may be a difficult balance between attracting and generating private 
sector business and activity, and ensuring that it does not undermine peace-
building. The focus should be on quality of activity in terms of its conflict risk 
or capacity for conflict-sensitive business practices.
 Transitional business regulation should have three attributes in terms of 
how it seeks to balance promoting investment with managing conflict risk and 
protective standards. These three are somewhat idealised notions for the 
sake of this working paper. They might arise to the extent (in any one setting) 
that transitory peacebuilding authorities perceive business-sourced conflict 
risk potential as significant, and to the extent that they have some influence, 
alongside local authorities, in setting the tone of the new investment and 
business climate.
6.1 Simple, stable standards capable of evolution 
 over time
Responsible regulation of business requires fostering business respect for 
universal values. As noted, the self-regulation promoted here is not ‘pure’ or 
voluntary. It is enforced, conditional, or accountable self-regulation: regulated 
self-regulation (Ford 2015). The essential message to business in transitional 
regulation is ‘do no harm’ (OECD 2007, Principle 2; OECD-DAC 2001, Guideline 
2), even if more sophisticated, detailed and demanding normative require-
ments exist both in the national laws of the post-conflict state (and investor-
origin ‘home’ states) and in evolving international law (the UNGPs).12 Transi-
tional business regulation posits that in an early post-settlement period, when 
peacekeepers and peacebuilders are severely swamped with competing 
priorities, business actors should at very least be explicitly held to the ten 
 12 Post-conflict settings may have enforce-
ment vacuums, but are not legal or norma-
tive vacuums.
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clear, basic human rights, labour, environmental precaution, and anti-corrup-
tion norms of the UN Global Compact. These have legitimacy and the utility of 
being easily-understood, easily communicated basic ideas about minimum 
acceptable business conduct for provisional / transitional regulatory pur-
poses. Breach of these will tend to result in unreasonable levels of conflict 
risk, relative to the merits of resumed business activity. Standards can 
become more sophisticated over time: as things normalise, existing features 
in the national law can be relied upon, enforced, and reformed. The UNGPs 
apply in these settings in any event. 
 The reason for suggesting that the message to business actors be 
somewhat simplified is that in post-conflict and crisis recovery situations, 
asserting a detailed, supervision-intensive regulatory code will not necessar-
ily address the transitional regulatory goal of preventing renewed conflict. 
Asserting some new, off-the-shelf ‘model code’ will not necessarily reassure 
serious investors. The highly detailed US-modelled Commercial Code enacted 
by the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq (Order 64 of 29 February 2004) 
may have seemed wonderfully comprehensive, but did not necessarily meet 
the overall transitional regulatory goals either of attracting or reassuring 
investment or (importantly) moderating its conflict risk. Post-conflict transi-
tional business regulation should be more about communicating expectations, 
sensitising business and developing a shared understanding, than about 
imposing detailed rules. Especially where the political economy of business 
activities was a major part of the conflict dynamic, seeding such a business 
culture early on may be of enduring significance in transforming patterns of 
conduct and increasing overall possibilities for peace. 
 During the transition, broad values should be communicated and 
businesses encouraged and enabled to meet them. Regulatory messaging 
ought to be undertaken in a vocabulary of broad ‘good enough’ governance 
principles that later come to be institutionalised as (reformed) national laws. 
Because it is only provisional, a post-conflict business regulation strategy 
requires principles that are stable but designed to evolve. Regulation against 
simple, general principles must be capable of being ‘ratcheted-up’ as state-
building allows greater normative and regulatory sophistication. One might 
draw relevant analogies here from the design of post-conflict tax systems 
(Gupta et al, 2007: 11). For example, in relation to the local private security 
industry, early post-conflict peacebuilders and local authorities should hold 
these actors to basic international standards. When time allows they then 
should begin a dialogue on a provisional code of conduct, and begin seeding 
the first discussions towards later reform of formal legal regulation of the 
industry to institutionalise the mitigation of conflict risk.
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6.2 Social impact standards that do not deter 
 good investors
Regulatory uncertainty compounds the political and security risks in post-
conflict settings. To the extent outsiders can influence the local business 
environment (in the way that the routinely seek to influence, ie regulate, the 
local political environment…), the transitional ideal is not to create regulatory 
demands on new business and investment that cannot be met. Some might 
argue that post-conflict business regulation in investment-starved places 
should not be too fussy about who comes along prepared to invest. However, 
quality matters: the ‘conflict lens’ does not see protective standards as 
incompatible with attracting good investment.
 Serious firms and enterprises may not desire extensive regulatory 
attention, but they are also unlikely to find a regulatory vacuum appealing. 
Larger reputable firms in particular need to assure their insurers, financiers 
and others back home that they are not operating in a standards-free setting. 
The most significant risk for post-conflict investors is major changes to the 
‘rules of the game.’ A regulatory approach must ‘level the playing field’ for all 
investors. Where it raises social responsibility standards transitional regula-
tion should do so equally for all like players. However, it should also avoid 
creating the perception of that international peacebuilding assistance and 
attention has created such a demanding social impact protective regime that 
good investment is deterred. It is difficult enough to attract good firms to risky 
places without creating new reputational risks (Bray, 2003). Thus transitional 
business regulation standards need only be tight enough for their context: 
realistic basic protections, not the gold standard. Over time, standards can 
rise and gain nuance. This is an area calling for further research especially of 
an empirical nature. However, while we can survey investors in post-conflict 
settings we will never know what other investment chose not to go, and what 
dissuaded them.
6.3 Using private law ends to public law means
Much of the relevant business conduct potentially affecting conflict risk, in 
particular existing major natural resource projects, will be covered by private 
law instruments and contracts. For example, mining firms may have contrac-
tual entitlements to operate their own security force, which may have broadly 
defined powers. So-called ‘stabilisation’ clauses may have ‘frozen’ national 
laws on social and environmental issues, quarantining these projects from law 
reform or higher standards. Where a company is undermining peacebuilding or 
could enhance it, transitional business regulation would suggest that legiti-
mate persuasion or pressure should be brought to bear to encourage or assist 
the company to honour (or exceed) its contractual obligations. In this respect, 
there is a role for home states in regulating the human rights impact (and so, 
generally, the conflict risk) of ‘their’ private sector firms and funds operating 
in fragile and conflict-affected settings, consistent with the UNGPs. 
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 Where major contracts are negotiated during the transitional period, 
external actors arguably have a ‘regulatory’ role in appropriately influencing 
the negotiation process where there is the potential for this to have a direct 
impact on peacebuilding. It might be highly significant for future peace 
consolidation that built into major contracts negotiated at this time are 
provisions (enforceable through private law means) that touch on issues 
typically heavy with conflict risk, such as land and water access and use, local 
private security forces, etc. In general, while UN peace operations and other 
external authorities have been mandated in effect to ‘regulate’ or co-regulate 
transitional justice, transitional elections, transitional security sector reform, 
transitional constitution-making, etc., they have not seen themselves as 
similarly influential or responsible when it comes to regulating conflict risk 
issues (short and long term) present in the process and terms on which 
transitional local authorities bind the post-conflict state to significant com-
mercial contracts (Ford 2015). This is an unreasonable and arbitrary practice 
of non-regulation, regulatory neglect, or denial of one’s power. It partly flows 
from the perception that such issues are not the responsibility of peacekeep-
ing and peacebuilding actors. Yet major resource investment contracts in 
particular can directly impact ‘peace and security’ (the core mandate of these 
actors); their revenue provisions can impact the overall fiscal viability of the 
new post-conflict dispensation and so the potential to ever transition out of 
fragility to a more stable developmental state. How is negotiation of these 
deals seen as too political and beyond the scope of peacebuilders’ responsi-
bilities and yet these same institutions routinely help negotiate constitutions, 
elections, etc.?
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Scoping a Further Research 
Agenda
This final section is brief since it constitutes mainly an invitation for discus-
sion on some of the themes raised in this working paper. One way to proceed is 
to conceive of a possible research agenda addressing practical problems and 
dilemmas for policymakers and practitioners, while also ensuring a degree of 
satisfactory conceptual robustness capable of underpinning serious real-
world engagements over time. What do we not know, or not know enough 
about, at the nexus of post-conflict transitions, peacebuilding, and the 
promotion of responsible investment and business? The challenge is partly 
empirical (the need for contextualised studies), partly conceptual (who do we 
mean by ‘business’, what is unique about ‘transitions’, etc.), partly normative 
(what are the standards against which responsible business and its regulation 
should be judged during post-conflict recovery), and partly institutional (who 
exactly is to carry out these regulatory responsibilities). In addition, there is a 
need to integrate ‘regulation’ in terms of influencing business actors’ impact 
on peace and security, with ‘regulation’ in terms of post-conflict economic 
policy on investment-promotion, taxation, business climate, and so on. An 
ideal approach to the economic dimensions of peacebuilding will seek to 
balance imperatives for growth and investment with conflict risk and protec-
tive considerations; an ideal approach to the political and security dimensions 
of peacebuilding will see business actors as relevant stakeholders and indeed 
‘regulatees’.
 Of these issues, and in practical policy terms, perhaps the one needing 
the most development relates to institutional responsibilities. Who exactly are 
the transitional regulators of business impact on peacebuilding? Which 
international organisation leads in coordinating these issues? Do they ‘belong’ 
to bodies with a peace and security mandate, or are they economic develop-
ment issues - or is this a false dichotomy? Arguably, in places where they are 
deployed UN peace operations or similar entities will be the peak ‘regulators’ 
of peace even if they share that role with local transitional or elected authori-
ties, donor bodies, and others. Influencing how business actors help or do not 
hinder peacebuilding is clearly within their conceivable mandated role, if not 
already implicit in most complex operations’ mandates (Ford 2015, Ch. 3). But 
what of post-conflict situations where there is no clear peak entity, and how 
useful is transitional business regulation (or whatever one might call it) to that 
wider set of situations of fragility that are not, as such, clear ‘post-conflict’ 
settings with an obvious mandated temporary international presence? 
 We may have to accept that the regulation of responsible business in 
post-conflict settings, whatever the technique applied, is in institutional 
terms a ‘mixed bag’. There is a governance gap in these places and on this 
issue, but it is not a governance vacuum. An aggregate of home and host state 
regulatory possibilities exists alongside the private governance schemes of 
insurers, industry groups and others. Together these more transnational, 
piecemeal forces may have more significance than any in-country efforts to 
shape either particular investors’ behaviour, or to set the tone for new post-
conflict investment. One challenge is to link what in-country peacebuilding 
authorities might do to these plural sources of legitimate influence, while also 
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remaining engaged with business actors and responsive to their legitimate 
concerns and contributions. Meanwhile, sometimes business-sourced conflict 
risk will not be a major issue in some settings; in others larger firms or the 
local business community may be well ahead of the authorities in terms of 
(self-)regulating the social, environmental and governance impacts on 
peacebuilding.
 Finally, this paper acknowledged at its outset a discomfort with, or at 
least awareness of, the suggestion that external agencies might be capable  
of exercising the proposed ‘regulatory’ influence. That is, ideas about transi-
tional business regulation can tend to suggest the existence of an all-knowing, 
all-seeing, capable external or transitional authority. It may tend to assume 
the existence of an agency or network of agencies able and willing to devote 
scarce time and attention during post-conflict recovery to deftly and expertly 
steer and shape the ways that commercial activity may affect the peacebuild-
ing mandate or imperative. The paper has recognised, but not dwelt on, the 
vital role and possible resistance of local sources of regulatory power and 
influence. As McEvoy notes, awareness of post-conflict complexity can 
prompt one to adopt idealised ordering measures in the hope of rendering 
problems ‘legible’ (2007: 421-4). In conclusion, transitional business regulation 
is advanced as a set of ideas because we might crave some ordering, orienting 
framework for how to approach the in-country promotion of conflict-sensitive 
business and investment after conflict. However, it is under no illusions about 
the limits of managerialism and the complex problems of legitimacy and 
effectiveness that affect all well-intentioned peacebuilding activities by 
outsiders. 
Scoping a Further Research Agenda
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